Apec Bilateral Trade Agreements

www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/english.html The result is a form of competitive liberalization. As with APEC itself, there are competing models of free trade agreements that cannot be integrated. The United States requires agreements that reflect its political, economic and strategic interests. Japan and South Korea are more selective and seek external opportunities while responding to domestic policy interests. Above all, China`s aim is to set precedents, learn from relatively insignificant negotiations or secure their energy supply. Neoliberal evangelicals promote purely more bilateral WTO agreements, which they hope can be extended to other parties; They cite the renewal of the Agreement between Singapore and New Zealand, which was signed with Chile on Pacific 3 and, in 2005, after Bruneis` accession to the Trans-Pacific Close Economic Partnership. Sub-regional initiatives are also under way. Increasingly, these governments are integrating a mix of models: ASEAN/ERC (Australia and New Zealand), ASEAN and China and the less developed ASEAN plus three. www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fta-ale.aspx?lang=eng American interests in promoting a prosperous and peaceful Asian region, a goal that seemed to move forward until the Asian financial crisis of 1997.

Trade and investment liberalization has been a central element of U.S. policy towards the region. This policy has brought direct benefits not only to U.S. companies, but also to beneficiaries in the form of cheaper imports and access to foreign capital. The process of financial liberalization has been flawed, as the 1997 crisis has shown, but the "win-win" approach of the US focus on trade and investment liberalization remains largely valid. At the 2001 APEC Heads of State and Government Summit in Shanghai, a declaration was made to promote free and open trade. The heads of state and government reached an agreement that allowed members to make faster progress in trade liberalization if they chose to do so. Since then, APEC leaders have even approved aid programs at sub-regional and bilateral levels. Early Friday, Japanese and New Zealand leaders warned countries against the temptation to back down on trade protectionism. To achieve APEC`s vision, the so-called "Bogor" goals, APEC`s core goals for free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 for industrialized countries and by 2020 for developing countries.

These objectives were adopted by the Heads of State and Government at their 1994 meeting in Bogor, Indonesia. Once again, the Anglo-American lobby was concerned about being deployed. In 2004, at the annual meeting of trade ministers in Chile, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Taipei and Canada urged these initiatives to be a free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region, which the APEC Business Advisory Group (ABAC) had called for as a way to overcome the "spaghetti-bowl" effect of free trade agreements. China, Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia have sunk the idea. However, Australia and New Zealand reached an ASEAN agreement in November 2004 on the opening of negotiations for a common free trade agreement in 2005. So-called free trade agreements are truly strategic initiatives, motivated by a combination of political loyalty, ideology, hegemonic objectives and fear of marginalization. APEC`s ambition to be a member body and its mypidic goal of "open regionalism" to achieve free trade and investment by 2010-2020 exclude criticism of neoliberal globalization and mask the critical contradictions inherent in competing models of capitalist expansion; Competing strategies for regional economic integration; power politics and hegemonic objectives. The most recent strategy, led by the neoliberal evangelical governments of